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            Abstract 
This article examines the impacts of firms’ political environment on the quality of their 
accounting practices. In specific, we hypothesize that the quality of political institutions is 
among the determinants of firms’ decisions regarding accounting practices, and test the 
hypothesis with a unique cross-country firm-level data set. Our results show that quality of 
corporate accounting practices is positively related to the quality of political institutions as 
measured by predictability of rules, laws, and regulations and of their interpretations in 
implementation. In political environments characterized by opaque public sector, it may be 
advantageous for firms to adopt shady accounting practices to cope with various risks arising 
from information asymmetry between government and business.  
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Introduction 
 Corporate governance in Asia has been in the spotlight since the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997. Corporate accounting practices have in particular drawn heavy scrutiny, and it is now 
a consensus among experts that poor accounting practices in Asian firms was a leading factor 
contributing to the crisis (Gelos and Wei, 2002; Johnson et al., 2000a; Vishwanath and 
Kaufmann, 1999). Poor accounting practices led to excessive exposure to debt, weak 
protection of the shareholders’ interests, and distortions in resource allocation in the economy 
(ADB, 2001; Mitton, 2002).  
Corporate accounting practices also have significant impacts on public sector 
governance. Because poor corporate accounting practices reduce the chance of detecting and 
exposing malfeasance, they open the door for shady exchanges with corrupt public officials. 
The impacts of such dubious accounting practices on public corruption have been confirmed 
by some recent empirical studies. Kimbro (2004) has shown that that quality of accounting 
standards is inversely associated with corruption, and Wu (2005) finds that prevalent 
corruption problems in many Asian countries are indeed due in part to poor quality of 
corporate financial reporting in the same milieu. In response to the Asian financial crisis, 
governments in many Asian countries have launched various reforms aimed at strengthening 
corporate accounting practices, in hopes of restoring investor confidence and enhancing 
public sector governance (ADB, 2001). In Thailand, for example, companies listed in the 
stock market must now submit quarterly and annual financial statements that conform to 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). In South Korea the government has taken 
significant measures to enhance the enforcement of accounting and auditing standards to 
conform to international standards. Countries largely unaffected by the crisis, such as China, 
have also recognized the financial risks associated with low-quality accounting practices and 
have embarked on accounting reforms of various kinds (Lin and Chen, 2000).  
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 Despite these efforts, progress in strengthening corporate accounting practices in Asia 
has been rather modest in the decade since the financial crisis (Morris et al., 2004); some have 
even perceived a decline in quality in recent years (Claessens and Fan, 2003).  Decisions on 
financial reporting are ultimately the responsibility of individual firms; yet such decisions are 
not made in a vacuum, and the external environment plays a critical role in how these 
decisions are made.  Choi (2002) concludes in his study of accounting reform in Korea that 
because corporate financial disclosure is deeply imbedded in cultural norms, change in 
accounting practices may take a long time to become fully implemented. Rosser (2003) 
observes that although adoption of international accounting standards among Indonesian 
firms may now project a positive image for foreign investors, little has changed in actuality, 
owing to the absence of a political environment conducive to accounting reform.   
 The impact of external environments on corporate accounting practices has also been 
highlighted in the literature on cross-country determinants of corporate financial reporting 
decisions. Studies have showed that corporate financial reporting is influenced by cultural 
values (Gray, 1988;  Zarzeski, 1996), legal systems (LaPorta et al., 1998; Ball et al., 2000; 
Jaggi and Low, 2000) and politico-economic factors (Ball, 2001; Archambault and 
Archambault; 2003; Bushman et al., 2004). The importance of external environmental 
influences suggests that corporate and public decision makers would be prudent to develop 
reasonable expectations of what accounting reforms can achieve in view of such constraints, 
and to think strategically about implementation of those reforms.  
 The present analysis seeks to extend the literature by focusing on the role of public 
sector transparency in determining firms’ decisions on accounting practices. Government 
plays an important role in shaping the operating environment to which corporate accounting 
practices respond, and degree of transparency in government actions shapes the degree of 
economic, financial, and political risks perceived by the corporate sector. In conditions of low 
public sector transparency, firms might find it advantageous to adopt substandard or dubious 
accounting practices in order to cope with various risks arising from asymmetry in 
information exchange between government and business. The analysis presented here used an 
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international data set drawn from individual corporations to explore characteristics of public 
sector transparency as perceived by firms in Asia and to test empirically the relationship 
between public sector transparency and quality of corporate accounting practices. 
Understanding the linkage between public sector transparency and corporate 
accounting practices has several important policy implications. First, policy makers in Asia 
should devise reform strategies that reflect on key features of the underlying political 
environment, such as level of public sector transparency. Ignoring the relationship between 
public sector transparency and corporate accounting practices could significantly reduce the 
effectiveness of the accounting reforms. Second, neglecting the characteristics of public 
sector governance (such as transparency) may fuel unrealistic (high) expectations regarding 
how soon accounting reforms can achieve their intended goals. Changes in accounting 
practices may come about only slowly as long as public sector transparency remains 
unchanged. Third, a better understanding of the role of public sector transparency in 
determining firms’ financial disclosure will enhance and expand the strategies and measures 
at the disposal of government. Targeted efforts to improve public sector transparency can in 
turn greatly improve prospects for successful accounting reforms.  
 Discussion below first reviews theoretical linkages between public sector 
transparency and corporate accounting practices and derives several testable hypotheses. 
Public sector transparency and corporate sector accounting practices in Asia are then 
considered in light of data from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES 2000) and 




Public Sector Transparency and Corporate Accounting Practices: Theoretical Linkages 
 There is no commonly agreed-upon definition of public sector transparency (Bellver 
and Kaufman, 2005). In the context of its impacts on the corporate operating environment, 
public sector transparency can be defined as the assurance of firms’ rights to certain types of 
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information that help to prevent potential abuses arising from asymmetry in information 
exchange between government and business.  
 Information asymmetry between government and business may take several forms. 
First, firms may not be aware of the existence of existing laws and governmental policies and 
regulations affecting the nature and conduct of their business. Information asymmetry is more 
pronounced in environments where changes in laws, policies, and regulations have occurred 
recently or frequently. The asymmetry may have disproportionately large effects on smaller 
firms, which may lack resources to keep track of such changes. Second, firms may have 
inadequate access to information on the conventions and procedures whereby changes in laws 
and regulations are effected. In such circumstances, firms might undermine their own 
positions by conforming to existing laws and regulations that will soon be modified or 
superseded. Third, information asymmetry may arise from discretionary administrative action 
in interpreting laws and regulations as applied to specific situations. Laws and regulations are 
often quite vague because of political compromises that were needed to ensure their passage, 
and this ambiguity leaves enormous discretionary leeway to the agencies or officials that 
implement them.  
 Corruption can further exacerbate the impacts of information asymmetry between 
government and business. Although it is important to distinguish lack of transparency from 
outright corruption, the two phenomena are closely linked, especially in their relationship to 
firms’ operating environments. Corrupt officials can more easily extract bribe payments from 
businesses that are confronted with acute information asymmetry problems; they can also 
intentionally increase the opaqueness of public sector activities in order to secure more bribe 
payments from businesses.  
 Firms’ responses to unpredictable operating environments that result from a low level 
of public sector transparency can be quite predictable. First, as a counterbalancing strategy to 
asymmetry arising from governmental sources, firms may choose to reduce informativeness 
in return, fashioning their accounting reporting so to obstruct access to corporate financial 
information. Firms may also simply choose to limit public access to actual corporate financial 
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information in hopes of cushioning against risks induced by an unpredictable operating 
environment.  
 Second, lack of transparency in the public sector reduces firms’ incentives to improve 
the quality of financial disclosure. Maintaining high-quality financial information reporting 
requires considerable time and resources, including high long-term costs and the deployment 
of highly educated human capital such as accountants and lawyers (Bushman and Smith, 
2001); the reward is presumed to be better prospects of attracting investments. Lack of 
transparency in the public sector undermines this type of effort by raising the variance of asset 
values and increasing the risk of investments, which can severely diminish investment flow to 
a particular country or sector or individual firm.  
 Third, lack of transparency in the public sector increases the business costs by 
imposing high transaction costs. In such conditions firms must expend critical resources to 
monitor and cope with unpredictable changes in laws and regulations and the procedural 
“rules of the game,” and senior corporate managers  must spend significant amounts of time 
dealing with officials who hold discretionary powers of interpreting and applying these 
directives. Faced with such costly government-related necessities, firms may feel no 
compunction in evading tax responsibility in order to survive. The main argument here is that 
the costs of not hiding corporate information can be too high.  
 Fourth, lack of transparency offers more leverage to predatory revenue officials who 
exact excessive rents or accept bribes not to do so. Firms may choose to underreport profits 
through fallacious accounting practices in order to avoid being targeted by such schemes. 
Clarke and Xu (2004) and Svensson (2003) have found that level of bribe payments is 
positively related to “ability to pay”; that is, firms that are more profitable firms are expected 
to pay more in bribes. Firms may elect to divert activities underground as a means of reducing 
vulnerability to extortion by government officials (Johnson et al., 2000b). 
 Fifth, lack of transparency also reduces costs of noncompliance with governmental 
strictures, especially with regard to corporate tax laws and regulations. Although tax evasion 
through flawed financial reporting is considered illegal in almost all countries, firms may find 
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it easier to get away with such activities in circumstances where  interpretation and 
implementation of tax laws and regulations are less transparent.  
 From these various considerations regarding low public sector transparency and 
asymmetries in private–public exchange of information three hypotheses can be formed:  
 Hypothesis 1: Firms that find it difficult to obtain information on laws and 
regulations are more likely to adopt low standards for corporate accounting practices. 
 Hypothesis 2: Firms that must cope with unexpected changes in rules, laws, and 
regulations are more likely to adopt low standards for corporate accounting practices. 
 Hypothesis 3: Firms that perceive the interpretation of regulations as unpredictable 




 To test these hypotheses data from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
were used to supply measures for economic modeling of relationships between public 
transparency and corporate accounting practices. Conducted by the World Bank in 1999–
2000 with the aim of understanding the constraints that businesses confronted, WBES covers 
83 countries, including 12 in Asia. Table 1 shows WBES coverage relating to Asia and the 
number of firms surveyed in each country. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
This data set differs in several respects from data used in other empirical studies on 
the determinants of corporate information disclosure.  First, it contains not only publicly listed 
firms but also privately held firms, thus providing unique insights into the determinants of 
financial disclosure for privately held firms. This is especially useful in a study of Asian 
countries, where most of firms are privately held.  
 Second, whereas most studies acknowledge the importance of external factors in 
influencing corporate financial disclosure and include measures of such factors in their 
analyses, the variables chosen are typically countrywide in nature and thus do not vary for 
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firms within the same country; as a result, variations across firms within individual countries 
have not been well accounted for in terms of internal factors. In the WBES-based data set 
developed for the present analysis, external variables provide firm-specific information and 
reflect the characteristics of external environments as experienced by individual firms.  
 Third, although level of conformity to international standards as reflected in items 
included in firms’ financial statements has often been used to measure quality of financial 
disclosure, such a measure is intermediate in nature and may not accurately reflect the actual 
quality of financial disclosure. By contrast, firms participating in WBES were directly asked 
about percentage of sales reported for tax purposes; the WBES-based data set used here for 
Asian countries thus can provide a direct measurement of quality of financial disclosure.   
 
Measuring Public Sector Transparency in Asia 
 Two aspects of public sector transparency are of particular importance from firms’ 
perspectives. The first is the predictability with which governments change the rules, laws, 
and regulations affecting firms (Bellver and Kaufmann, 2005). The second is predictability 
with which these laws and regulations are interpreted in implementation. Several questions in 
the WBES were directly related to these same aspects of firms’ perceptions of public sector 
transparency. One question assessed the level of difficulty firms had experienced in obtaining 
information on laws and regulations affecting their business; another elicited firms’ 
impressions regarding predictability of changes in such laws and regulations. Firms were also 
asked about the whether interpretations of regulations affecting their business were 
predictable. Responses to these questions were used to measure public transparency in the 
analysis presented here.  
 Table 2 shows that the majority of firms surveyed in Asia (66%) found the laws and 
regulations affecting their firms to be easy to obtain, at least to some degree, although 
significant variations occurred across countries. For example, roughly half of firms in 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Thailand rated access to laws and regulations affecting their 
business as very easy to somewhat easy; but in Singapore the proportion of firms reporting 
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that degree of accessibility was 98%, with the remaining  2% reporting that access was only 
somewhat difficult. Sizeable variations can also be observed across firms within countries, 
suggesting that perceived information asymmetry regarding difficulty of obtaining relevant 
laws and regulations may depend on a firm’s particular sector and geographic location.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 Table 2 also indicates a similar pattern with Asian firms’ impressions of the 
predictability of interpretations of laws and regulations on implementation. Although the 
majority of firms (64%) found these interpretations to some degree predictable in application, 
significant variations can be seen both across countries and across firms within countries.  
 In comparison, a high percentage of firms expressed concern about the predictability 
of laws and regulations affecting their businesses:  52% believed that changes in laws and 
regulations were to some extent unpredictable. This perception was very strongly reported by 
firms in Thailand (60%), Bangladesh (61%), Indonesia (66%), and especially Kazakhstan 
(88%). 
 
Corporate Accounting Practices in Asia 
 As mentioned above, maintaining high-quality financial reporting is expensive in 
both time and resources. Many firms in developing countries in Asia may be reluctant to 
commit the resources necessary for maintaining high-quality financial information reporting. 
However, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 prompted changes in firms’ perception of the 
importance of full and accurate financial disclosure. It is now widely believed that inadequate 
disclosure was a leading cause of the crisis. Choi (2002) has argued that noncompliance of 
financial statements with international standards, deficiencies in disclosure, and lack of 
rigorous monitoring by external auditors were among the leading causes for the financial 
crisis in Korea. Rahman (1998), who conducted a comparative study of five East Asian 
countries affected by the crisis—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and 
Thailand—found that most of the companies in these countries did not follow international 
accounting standards.  
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 Since the 1997 crisis, many Asian countries have undertaken accounting reforms to 
strengthen the quality of financial disclosure. Countries that largely escaped the crisis, such as 
China, have also recognized the financial risks associated with poor accounting practices (Lin 
and Chen, 2000). Typical reform measures in Asian countries have involved the adoption of 
international accounting standards and independent auditing practices. Table 3 shows that 
among firms the effects of these reform initiatives have been quite impressive: roughly 50% 
of firms in the WBES sample now use international accounting standards, and about 60% hire 
external auditors to review their annual financial statements.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 Adoption of rules and regulations in accounting reforms, however, should not be 
interpreted as equivalent to having good accounting practices. Accounting scandals in the 
United States, involving noted firms such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, suggest that 
accounting flaws occur even in developed countries with good accounting rules and highly 
competent financial professionals. Accounting standards are only as good as the enforcement 
mechanisms driving them, and external auditors may align their interests with corrupt 
corporate boards and managers, turning a blind eye on irregularities in accounting reports.  
 The difficulties of carrying out accounting reforms are confirmed by  empirical 
results of the present analysis. Table 4 indicates that there is a sizable disparity between 
accounting standards and their actual implementation. Although 50% of firms used 
international accounting standards and 60% hired external auditors to review annual financial 
reports, only 42% reported 100% of their sales for accounting purposes. This disparity was 
especially notable for firms in South Asia. For example, in Bangladesh, whereas 76% of firms 
used international accounting standards and 95% used external auditors for annual financial 
reports, only 18% reported 100% of their sales for tax purposes—in fact more than half 
reported less than 70%. It is clear that conforming to new accounting standards did not in 
itself not guarantee good-quality financial disclosure.  




 Table 5 summarizes the variables used in the models developed for the present 
analysis. Corporate accounting practices were measured by five variables focusing on two 
related but distinct aspects, adoption of accounting standards and quality of actual accounting 
practices. The first variable, IAS, indicates whether or not firms adopted International 
Accounting Standards. The second variable, AUDIT, indicates whether firms had their annual 
financial reports reviewed by external auditors. The next three variables measure the quality 
of firms’ actual accounting practices in terms of how they reported sales for tax purposes: the 
third variable, REPORT, indicates the extent to which firms reported their sales for tax 
purposes; the fourth and fifth variables, REPORTLOW AND REPORTUP, indicates what 
percentages of the sales firms reported for tax purposes. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 Public sector transparency was measured by three variables: TRANSAVA, 
TRANSLAW, and TRANSINT, corresponding to the three hypotheses stated at the close of 
theoretical discussion above. The first variable, TRANSAVA, measures the degree of 
difficulty firms perceived in obtaining information on laws and regulations affecting their 
business. The second, TRANSLAW, measures the extent to which the changes in laws and 
regulations affecting firms’ business were perceived to be predictable. The third variable, 
TRANSINT, measures the extent to which interpretations of laws and regulations affecting 
firms were regarded as transparent.  
 The variables just described are the main focus of interest here, but other variables 
were included in the models to control for alternative interpretations of corporate accounting 
practices. First among these are firm characteristics such as size and ownership type. Large 
firms may have more resources with which to provide better corporate financial reporting 
than small firms do. Also, large firms may be more securely established and thus able to 
reveal comprehensive financial information with less fear that it will be misinterpreted (Jaggi 
and Low, 2000). 
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Second, ownership structure may also affect firms’ accounting practices. Enterprises 
with foreign shareholders are likely to adopt corporate accounting standards that conform to 
international practices, in order to avoid trouble when sharing financial reportage. 
Governance structure can also affect firms’ decisions on accounting practices. Firms 
established as single proprietorship or partnership may be under less pressure to require 
comprehensive and detailed disclosures, as principle–agent problems are not conspicuous. By 
contrast, firms with dispersed ownership are more likely to adopt high standards for 
accounting practices as managerial responsibilities are shared among board members and 
sharing of financial information is essential. In most countries, firms listed in stock market 
have to adopt high standards for accounting practices in order to meet stringent requirements 
to be listed in stock exchange.  
 Third, operating environment can also play a significant role in firms’ financial 
reporting decisions. For example, firms may choose poor accounting practices in order to 
avoid paying taxes. Johnson et al. (2000b) have documented that in Eastern European 
countries firms facing higher effective tax rates are indeed likely hide their sales and profits. 
For present purposes, the extent to which high taxes were perceived by Asian firms as 
problematic (TAXBURDEN) has been used as a proxy for the level of taxes firms 
encountered. The expectation is that the more problematic taxes are perceived to be, the more 
likely firms would be to choose low-quality financial disclosure in order to avoid the problem. 
 Given the nature of the dependent variables, three types of econometric model, probit, 
ordered probit and interval regression, were used to test the three hypotheses regarding the 
role of public sector transparency in determining corporate accounting practices in Asia. The 
probit model focuses on firms’ decisions to adopt International Accounting Standards as well 
as on their decisions to use external auditors. The ordered probit model and interval models 
focus on the determinants of the quality of corporate financial reporting as measured by the 
percentage of sales firms reported for tax purposes 
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 In the probit model, it is assumed that the propensity for firms ( ) to adopt good 
accounting practices is a function of a set of variables, including the test variables and control 
variable. That is,  
*
iy
 ,        (1) iii uxy += '* β
where is a “latent” variable that cannot be observed directly. What is observed is a dummy 
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 In the present model, where yi is measured by IAS and AUDIT, the likelihood 









i xFxFL ββ ,      (3) 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of u.   
 In the ordered probit model, it is assumed that reported sales for tax purposes ( ) is 
a function of a set of variables, including the test variables and control variable. That is,  
*
iy
 ,         (4) iii uxy += '* β
where is a “latent” variable that cannot be observed directly. What we observe is  *iy
 yi = 1, if  25% <*iy
 = 2, if 25%  50% <≤ *iy
 = 3, if 50%  60% <≤ *iy
 = 4, if 60%  70% <≤ *iy
 = 5, if 80%  70% <≤ *iy
 = 6, if 90%  80% <≤ *iy
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 = 7, if 90%  100% <≤ *iy
 = 8, if 100%. =*iy
  
The corresponding probabilities for each ordinal interval can be stated as:  
 
 Prob (  = )1=iy )'25.0( ixβφ −  
 Prob (  = )2=iy )'25.0()'5.0( ii xx βφβφ −−−   
 Prob (  = )3=iy )'5.0()'6.0( ii xx βφβφ −−−  
 Prob (  = )4=iy )'6.0()'7.0( ii xx βφβφ −−−  
 Prob (  = )5=iy )'7.0()'8.0( ii xx βφβφ −−−  
 Prob (  = )6=iy )'8.0()'9.0( ii xx βφβφ −−−  
 Prob (  = )7=iy )'9.0()'1( ii xx βφβφ −−−  
 Prob (  = )8=iy )'1(1 ixβφ −− . 
And log-likelihood of the model can be specified as  











where ]'[, ijji xβμφφ −= , ]'[ 11, ijji xβμφφ −= −− and Zij is an indicator variable which 
equals 1 if and 0 otherwise.  jyi =
 The same as in the ordered probit model, the dependent variables in the interval 
regression model—REPORTLOW and REPORTUP—are constructed from firms’ responses 
to the question on the percentage of the firm’s sales reported for tax purposes. There are 
however two important distinctions. First, only firms reporting less than 100% of their sales 
are included in the estimation. Second, the actual percentage terms instead of categories are 
used in the model. Seven brackets are constructed, corresponding to firms reporting less than 
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25%, 25 to 49%, 50-59%, 60 to 69%, 70 to 79%, 80-89% and 90 to 99%.  They are, 
respectively, (0, 0.25), (0.25, 0.49), (0.5, 0.59), (0.6, 0.69), (0.7, 0.79), (0.8, 0.89) and 
(0.9, .099). The two numbers in the each bracket indicate the lower (REPORTLOW) and 
upper bound (REPORTUP) of the percentage of sales reported by the firm for tax purposes. 



















Descriptive statistics of variables in the model are shown in Table 5.  Many firms had 
adopted international accounting standards (48%) and had their annual financial statements 
reviewed by external auditors (58%). The majority of these firms were small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs); about half being small (≤50 employees) and one-third being 
medium-sized (51 to 200 employees). Close to a quarter of the firms in the sample involve 
foreign interests, an indication that globalization has made significant impacts on the 
landscape of firm ownership in Asia. About 40% of the firms in the sample were formed 
either as single proprietorship or as partnership, and 10% of the firms were listed on a stock 
exchange.  This is not surprising given the dominance of SMEs in the sample.  
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 6 shows the results of the probit model of firms’ adoption of accounting 
standards. Columns 1–3 in Table 6 report the coefficients and standard errors of probit models 
for the adoption of International Accounting Standards; columns 4–6 show the results for use 
of external auditors. The differences among Models 1, 2, and 3 are in the measures of public 
sector transparency, and the same can be said about Models 4, 5, and 6. Because the measures 
of public sector transparency are highly correlated as one might expect, we entered those 
measures into the models one at a time, to forestall multicollinearality problems.  
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
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 Most control variables in these models are generally consistent with the prior 
predictions as well as the findings of other empirical studies, although statistical significance 
levels vary depending on model specifications. In the present analysis, variables on firm 
characteristics proved to be statistically significant in determining the firms’ accounting 
practices. The coefficients on SMALL and MEDIUM show that bigger firms were more 
likely to adopt accounting practices conforming to international norms and expectations—a 
finding that is statistically significant for all models. Coefficients for FOREIGN indicate that 
firms with foreign ownership were more likely to adopt International Accounting Standards 
and to use external auditors than firms that were domestically owned, a sign that globalization 
may have positive impacts on the spread of better accounting practices.  Expectations 
regarding the effects of firms’ ownership structure are also confirmed in the results: firms 
formed as single proprietorship were less likely to adopt International Accounting Standards 
or to employ external auditors, and listed corporations were more likely to adopt high 
standards of accounting practices.  Last, although the negative coefficients on TAXBURDEN 
in all six models suggest that firms that reported resentment of high taxes were less likely to 
adopt high standards in accounting practices, the perception of high taxes has greater impacts 
on the adoption of International Accounting Standards than on the use of external auditors.   
 Public sector transparency measured by predictability of policies, laws, and 
regulations as well as their implementation was shown to have the expected effects on both 
adoption of International Accounting Standards and use of external auditors, although 
statistical significance levels vary depending on the dependent variables in the model. First, 
all three variables for public sector transparency registered positive effects on the adoption of 
International Accounting Standards and the use of external auditors. Second, the coefficients 
for public sector transparency variables are statistically significant for Models 4, 5, and 6, for 
which AUDIT is the dependent variable, but not for Models 1, 2, and 3, for which IAS is the 
dependent variable. Third, the size of coefficients for public sector transparency is much 
larger in models for AUDIT than those for IAS. Overall, effects of public sector transparency 
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manifested more clearly in firms’ decisions to engage external auditors than in their decisions 
to adopt International Accounting Standards.  
 As discussed earlier, the adoption of International Accounting Standards and 
international norms should not be interpreted as equivalent to having good-quality corporate 
accounting practices. Table 7 reports the results of the ordered probit model and interval 
regression model for firms’ actual performance in corporate accounting practices: Models 7, 8, 
and 9 are ordered probit models for which the dependent variable is REPORT; Models 10, 11, 
and 12 are interval regression models for which the dependent variables are REPORTLOW 
AND REPORTUP. Firm size is shown to be inversely related to percentage of sales reported 
(except for coefficients on SMALL in Model 11 through 12), but the effects are not 
statistically significant for all models. Firm ownership matters: the coefficients on both 
FOREIGN are statistically and economically significant in all six models, suggesting that 
foreign ownership had positive effects on the quality of firms’ actual accounting practices. 
While the results show that the listed firms are more truthful in reporting their sales for tax 
purposes, the coefficients on SINGLEPROP and PARTNER show that the effects of 
ownership structure on the quality of actual accounting practices are not as clear-cut as on the 
adoption of International Accounting Standards and the use of external auditors. 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 7 also shows that predictability of laws and regulations and also transparency 
of their interpretation are positively correlated with sales reported for tax purposes. The 
coefficients of all three variables (TRANSAVA, TRANSLAW, and TRANSINT) not only 
have expected signs on all models but also statistically significant.  It thus appears that firms 
had greater incentive to reveal accurate financial information when information on laws and 
regulations was easier to obtain, when the change of laws and regulations was predictable, 




 The opaqueness of the public sector in Asia has been widely reported, and the 
empirical findings of the present analysis confirm that perception. Just over half (52%) of the 
firms sampled for this analysis reported that changes in laws and regulations that affected 
their business activities ranged from “fairly unpredictable” to “completely unpredictable.” 
Although fewer firms reported difficulty in obtaining laws and regulations or unpredictability 
in interpretations applied to laws and regulations, those factors nevertheless comprised a 
sizable share of the picture: one-third of the firms sampled held a negative opinion of these 
aspects of public sector transparency. At the same time, many firms in the sample opted for 
low-quality corporate accounting practices. Only 42% reported 100% of their sales for tax 
purposes; in China, more than 50% of firms reported less than 60%. These findings strongly 
support other research that has recognized shady accounting practices as a major determinant 
of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and as a major obstacle to sustaining the impressive 
growth of Asia’s corporate sector.  
 The regression models presented here verify the three hypotheses that were stated 
with regard to the effects of public sector transparency on firms’ decisions on accounting 
practices, although strength of the relationship varies across models. As expected, the 
perceived difficulty of obtaining laws and regulations relevant to business activities 
(TRANSAVA) had positive effects on adoption of International Accounting Standards, the 
use external auditors (AUDIT), and the percentage of sales firms reported for tax purposes 
(REPORT , REPORTLOW, AND REPORTUP). These effects proved to be statistically 
significant for AUDIT, REPORT, REPORTLOW and REPORTUP, but not for IAS. The 
same can be said about both the transparency of laws and regulations (TRANSLAW) and the 
predictability of interpretation of laws and regulations (TRANSINT).  
Overall, the effects of public sector transparency on the adoption of International 
Accounting Standards turned out to be quite weak (none of the coefficients is statistically 
significant) in contrast to results for use of external auditors (all three coefficients are both 
statistically and economically significant) and quality of actual accounting practices measured 
as percentage of sales firms reported for tax purposes. The disparities across models suggest 
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that the effects of public sector transparency were more pronounced in corporate information 
disclosure. Both use of external auditors and percentage of sales reported for tax purposes 
involved the revelation of corporate financial information to outsiders, whereas adoption of 
IAS did not. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 many Asian countries have 
undertaken accounting reforms to strengthen the quality of accounting practices. Typical 
reform measures have involved the adoption of International Accounting Standards and 
independence in audit. The success of these accounting reforms not only will determine the 
business competitiveness of Asia but also will influence the quality of public sector 
governance (Wu, 2005).  
 The evidence presented here demonstrates the mutual dependency between public 
sector governance and corporate governance and reveals mechanisms through which such 
interdependency might be harnessed to enhance the effectiveness of governance reforms. 
Quality of corporate financial reporting was shown to be positively related to the public sector 
transparency, as measured by the predictability of policies, laws, and regulations as well as 
their interpretations in implementation.  
Several implications arise from these findings. First, firms may choose to reduce the 
informativeness of their financial reporting, creating information asymmetry as a 
counterbalancing strategy against perceived information asymmetry in public sector activity. 
Second, lack of transparency in the public sector reduces the incentives for firms to improve 
the quality of accounting practices. Third, lack of transparency in the public sector increases 
business costs, by imposing high transaction costs upon firms, to the extent that some may be 
forced to evade tax responsibility through fallacious accounting practices in order to survive. 
Fourth, lack of transparency offers more leverage to predatory public officials who seek to 
extract rents from businesses; firms may choose to underreport profits through fallacious 
accounting practices in order to avoid being targeted. Fifth, lack of transparency also reduces 
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the costs of firms’ noncompliance with public directives, especially with regard to tax laws 
and regulations.  
 This analysis of the linkage between public sector transparency and corporate 
accounting practices offers several important policy lessons for designing and implementing 
accounting reforms in Asia. First, it confirms that quality of corporate accounting practices is 
constrained by quality of public sector transparency. Policy makers in the region should take 
public sector transparency into consideration when designing and implementing accounting 
reforms. Different countries will face different challenges in accounting reforms, depending 
on how their corporate systems match up with prevailing political environments. This 
variability demands varied solutions. Ignoring such interrelationships between public sector 
transparency and corporate accounting practices may reduce the relevancy of reform policies.  
 Second, governments should not commit to specific, comprehensive reform measures 
prematurely. Much of the real progress that occurs might depend on what happens to firms’ 
political environment. Firms’ corporate governance practices are largely shaped by forces 
outside their corporate boardrooms. There is little chance that adoption of International 
Accounting Standards will lead to high-quality accounting practices as long as firms and their 
political patrons both have vested interests in keeping the public sector opaque to protect 
existing rent-seeking schemes. For example, tightening standards for publicly listed firms 
prematurely may serve as a disincentive for firms to become listed; they may become 
convinced that it is impossible to meet the proposed standards under opaque public sector 
conditions.  
 Third, the findings presented here do not at all imply a narrowing of available choices 
for measures of reform. In fact, they broaden the scope for effective measures for corporate 
financial disclosure by placing a new set of instruments, focused on corporate operating 
environments, at the disposal of those charged with projecting and implementing reforms. 
Pointed efforts can now be made at improving both the effectiveness of accounting reforms 
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 Table 1. World Business Environment Survey (2000) Coverage in Asia 
















Table 2. Public Sector Transparency as Perceived by Firms across Asian Countries 
Difficulty in Obtaining the Law and Regulation Affecting Firms 
 Very difficult  
Difficult in 






most cases Very easy 
Azerbaijan 6% 5% 13% 20% 42% 15% 
Bangladesh 0% 12% 36% 6% 34% 12% 
Cambodia 4% 5% 21% 49% 9% 13% 
China 3% 10% 14% 22% 37% 14% 
India 4% 4% 18% 32% 31% 10% 
Indonesia 11% 12% 26% 40% 8% 3% 
Kazakhstan 6% 13% 11% 14% 27% 29% 
Malaysia 0% 1% 8% 39% 42% 10% 
Pakistan 12% 9% 16% 41% 16% 6% 
Philippines 1% 6% 16% 32% 29% 15% 
Singapore 0% 0% 2% 11% 49% 38% 
Thailand 3% 12% 34% 34% 16% 1% 
Subtotal 4% 8% 21% 32% 24% 12% 














Azerbaijan 5% 9% 12% 46% 6% 23% 
Bangladesh 2% 20% 39% 33% 4% 2% 
Cambodia 14% 17% 28% 35% 4% 2% 
China 5% 12% 19% 36% 24% 3% 
India 4% 9% 40% 44% 1% 1% 
Indonesia 10% 35% 21% 22% 11% 0% 
Kazakhstan 41% 12% 34% 8% 2% 2% 
Malaysia 13% 8% 16% 46% 13% 3% 
Pakistan 9% 5% 19% 55% 12% 0% 
Philippines 6% 13% 28% 35% 12% 6% 
Singapore 2% 2% 9% 55% 27% 5% 
Thailand 8% 12% 40% 30% 9% 1% 
Subtotal 10% 13% 29% 36% 9% 3% 














Azerbaijan 4% 6% 12% 22% 48% 9% 
Bangladesh 0% 10% 27% 29% 23% 10% 
Cambodia 5% 4% 25% 49% 9% 7% 
China 1% 8% 21% 33% 28% 9% 
India 4% 12% 29% 46% 7% 1% 
Indonesia 13% 10% 35% 35% 5% 2% 
Kazakhstan 9% 20% 19% 16% 23% 13% 
Malaysia 2% 0% 8% 38% 41% 11% 
Pakistan 5% 12% 21% 37% 23% 2% 
Philippines 3% 11% 20% 21% 35% 9% 
Singapore 1% 0% 3% 14% 48% 34% 
Thailand 1% 8% 32% 35% 21% 3% 
Subtotal 4% 8% 24% 35% 22% 8% 
Source:  WBES (2000) and author’s calculations. 
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Table 3. Asian Firms Adopting International Accounting Standards (IAS) and External Auditing 
of Annual Financial Reporting (AUDIT) 
 Percent of firms use 
international accounting 
standards (IAS) 
Percent of firms have annual 
financial statements that have 
been reviewed by external 
auditor 
Azerbaijan 18% 8% 
Bangladesh 76% 95% 
Cambodia 27% 22% 
China 12% 43% 
India 75% 97% 
Indonesia 45% 52% 
Kazakhstan 63% 37% 
Malaysia 20% 47% 
Pakistan 64% 52% 
Philippines 31% 81% 
Singapore 68% 95% 
Thailand 62% 83% 
Total 48% 58% 
 
 
Data source: WBES (2000) and author’s calculations. 
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Table 4. Accounting Practices in Asian Firms: Sales Reported for Tax Purposes 
  
Less than 
50% 50-59% 60-69% 70-79% 80-89% 90-99% 
All 
(100%) 
Azerbaijan 11% 16% 14% 8% 5% 9% 37%
Bangladesh 0% 15% 36% 10% 10% 10% 18%
Cambodia 0% 41% 9% 5% 6% 7% 31%
China 8% 48% 10% 1% 3% 7% 24%
India 0% 2% 3% 4% 1% 9% 81%
Indonesia 15% 14% 5% 2% 14% 11% 39%
Kazakhstan 3% 7% 10% 4% 8% 12% 56%
Malaysia 44% 19% 3% 1% 1% 9% 22%
Pakistan 16% 20% 18% 6% 4% 3% 33%
Philippines 8% 12% 3% 4% 6% 17% 49%
Singapore 8% 5% 1% 0% 1% 2% 82%
Thailand 1% 18% 17% 9% 15% 10% 31%
Total 7% 19% 11% 5% 7% 9% 42%
 
 
Data source: WBES (2000) and author’s calculation.
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IAS Dummy variable. 1=firm adopts international accounting standards; 
0=all others 0.48 0.50
AUDIT Dummy variable. 1=Annual financial statements reviewed by external 
auditor; 0=all others 0.58 0.49
REPORT Categorical variable indicating percentage of total sales reported for tax 
purposes (1=less than 25%; 2=25 to 49%; 3=50 to 59%; 4=60 to 69%; 
5=70 to 79%; 6=80 to 89%; 7=90-99%; 8=100%) 5.11 2.58
REPORTLOW The percentage of the total sales reported for tax purposes (lower 
bound) 0.52 0.27
REPORTUP The percentage of the total sales reported for tax purposes  (upper 
bound) 0.65 0.23
Test Variables 
TRANSAVA The extent to which information on the laws and regulations affecting 
the firms is easy to obtain. Scale from 1 to 6 (1=very difficult; 
2=difficult in most cases; 3=somewhat difficult; 4=somewhat easy; 
5=easy in most cases; 6=very easy) 3.99 1.26
TRANSLAW The extent to which the changes in rules, laws and regulations are 
predictable. Scale from 1 to 6 (1=completely unpredictable; 2=highly 
unpredictable; 3=fairly unpredictable; 4=fairly predictable; 5=highly 
predictable; 6=completely predictable) 3.30 1.21
TRANSINT The extent to which the interpretations of rules, laws and regulations are 
predictable. Scale from 1 to 6 (1=completely unpredictable; 2=highly 
unpredictable; 3=fairly unpredictable; 4=fairly predictable; 5=highly 
predictable; 6=completely predictable) 3.86 1.19
Control Variables 
SMALL Dummy variable. 1=Small size firm (less than 50 employees); 0=all 
others 0.47 0.50
MEDIUM Dummy variable. 1=Medium size firm (50 employees and above but 
less than 500); 0=all others 0.35 0.48
FOREIGN Dummy variable. 1=Firm with some share of foreign ownership; 0=all 
others 0.23 0.42
SINGLEPROP Dummy variable. 1=Firm registered as single proprietorship; 0=all 
others 0.28 0.45
PARTNER Dummy variable. 1=Firm registered as partnership; 0=all others 0.16 0.36
PRIVATE Dummy variable. 1=Firm registered as privately-held company; 0=all 
others 0.35 0.48
LISTED Dummy variable. 1=Firm listed on a stock market; 0=all others 0.10 0.31
TAXBURDEN The extent to which high taxes are problematic. Scale from 1 to 4 (1=no 




Table 6.  Probit Models: Adoption of Accounting Standards 
  
Dependent Variable: IAS Dependent Variable: Audit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SMALL -0.545*** -0.543*** -0.566*** -0.593*** -0.608*** -0.618***
  (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139)
MEDIUM -0.196* -0.222** -0.218** -0.442*** -0.466*** -0.471***
  (0.108) (0.108) (0.107) (0.137) (0.136) (0.136)
FOREIGN 0.730*** 0.744*** 0.719*** 0.742*** 0.699*** 0.743***
  (0.094) (0.095) (0.094) (0.115) (0.115) (0.114)
SINGLEPROP -0.763*** -0.792*** -0.803*** -0.985*** -1.015*** -0.965***
  (0.145) (0.149) (0.146) (0.168) (0.172) (0.167)
PARTNER 0.151 0.124 0.120 -0.104 -0.119 -0.085
  (0.147) (0.149) (0.147) (0.164) (0.166) (0.163)
PRIVATE 0.230 0.178 0.196 -0.011 -0.007 0.016
  (0.141) (0.143) 0.141 0.165 0.166 0.163
LISTED 0.455*** 0.374** 0.401** 0.823*** 0.730*** 0.808***
  (0.170) (0.172) (0.170) (0.236) (0.238) (0.231)
TAXBURDEN -0.072** -0.090** -0.074** -0.037 -0.044 -0.036
  (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
TRANSAVA 0.032     0.080**     
  (0.030)     (0.035)     
TRANSLAW   0.027     0.069***   
    (0.032)     (0.038)   
TRANSINT     0.027     0.110**
      (0.032)     (0.036)
CONSTANT 0.591** 0.668** 0.636** 0.626* 0.670** 0.665*
  (0.296) (0.288) (0.300) (0.360) (0.342) (0.365)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of 
Observations 1693 1682 1693 1593 1586 1593
Pseudo-R2 0.289 0.284 0.287 0.446 0.446 0.446
 
 
Note: The table reports unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
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Table 7. Ordered Probit Models and Interval Reggression Models: Accounting Practices 
  
Dependent Variable: REPORT 
Dependent Variable:             
REPORTUP and REPORTLOW 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SMALL -0.073 -0.089 -0.091 0.006 0.004 0.006
  (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
MEDIUM -0.026 -0.050 -0.059 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
  (0.088) (0.087) (0.087) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
FOREIGN 0.237*** 0.205*** 0.234*** 0.045** 0.037* 0.042**
  (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
SINGLEPROP -0.023 0.058 0.026 -0.009 0.000 -0.008
  (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
PARTNER 0.216* 0.251** 0.245** 0.061** 0.058* 0.056*
  (0.123) (0.123) (0.122) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
PRIVATE 0.182 0.222* 0.200* 0.054* 0.052* 0.051*
  (0.115) (0.115) (0.114) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
LISTED 0.274* 0.358** 0.300** 0.083** 0.080** 0.077**
  (0.141) (0.141) (0.139) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
TAXBURDEN -0.011 -0.030 -0.015 0.010 0.008 0.010
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
TRANSAVA 0.120***     0.021***     
  (0.024)     (0.006)     
TRANSLAW   0.055**     0.017***   
    (0.025)     (0.006)   
TRANSINT     0.094***     0.018***
      (0.026)     (0.006)
CONSTANT    0.445*** 0.471*** 0.451***
     (0.058) (0.057) (0.061)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1519 1513 1519 1032 1029 1036
Pseudo-R2 0.063 0.059 0.060      
 
Note: The table reports unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
 
